Spain's data protection agency, the AEPD, issued two preventive, non-sanctioning warnings to two municipalities whose video surveillance tenders include AI image-analysis functions, telling each to assess and document safeguards function by function before use

Key takeaways

• Both warnings are preventive and non-sanctioning, and each cites the GDPR and Organic Law 7/2021, not the AI Act.
• The trigger in each case was a tender specification. The AEPD says the papers do not show whether facial functions will be activated (AI-00170) or whether facial recognition or biometric identification will occur (AI-00171).
• The AEPD expects each AI function to be justified separately, and says availability in purchased hardware or software does not justify use.
• Each warning closes with a conditional consequence: not adopting any measures that may be necessary could lead to preliminary investigation or corrective action, including sanctioning action.

What did the AEPD say in AI-00170, and what does it expect before use?

It said a municipal tender points to future AI image analysis, and that the papers do not settle whether the facial functions will be used. The six-page warning, ref. EXP202621928, concerns tender file 1616529E, titled "Suministro, instalación, puesta en marcha y mantenimiento de sistema de videovigilancia para la seguridad ciudadana". The technical specification (PPT), dated 22 June 2026, covers new cameras in municipal buildings and bounded municipal areas, managed centrally from the Policía Local premises. Pages 10 and 11, in the recorder specifications, expressly require "detección/reconocimiento facial".

The AEPD treats that as an indication that the system could analyse images of people with AI and, eventually, identify them uniquely. It adds: "La documentación examinada no permite determinar si estas funcionalidades serán efectivamente activadas". It also says the papers do not show whether templates, vectors or biometric representations would be generated, whether 1:1 or 1:N comparisons would run, or whether reference galleries would be used.

What does the AEPD expect before an AI video function is used?

A documented, function-by-function justification, completed before the system goes into service. In AI-00170 the AEPD says the following are to be analysed and documented:

• the necessity and proportionality of each AI function for the specific purpose, with data minimisation and purpose limitation;
• that unneeded functions stay disabled by default;
• the data and metadata generated, their retention periods, access profiles and remote access;
• safeguards for later updates, extensions or configuration changes that add analysis or identification capability.

Where processing is likely to carry a high risk, the warning says a data protection impact assessment is to be carried out before processing (art. 35 GDPR and art. 35 of Organic Law 7/2021). It also expects information for affected people (art. 13 GDPR and art. 21 of the Organic Law) and, for Policía Local processing under the Organic Law, review against arts. 6, 11, 13, 15, 16 and 18 before implementation.

Two passages matter most for procurement. On activation, a new identification or re-identification capability needs a specific prior assessment, "sin que su mera disponibilidad en el hardware o software adquirido pueda justificar automáticamente su utilización". On scope, proportionality is to be judged for each added analysis function and not only for the installation of cameras. Recordings are generally to be destroyed within three months where art. 18 of the Organic Law applies, and the warning separately calls for a retention regime for derived data such as metadata, biometric templates, vectors and match results.

What did AI-00171 add?

A second, more detailed description of AI features, and a different position on facial recognition. The seven-page warning, ref. EXP202621933, concerns tender CONT-059/2025 (Ref. 34741/2025) for the supply, installation, integration, commissioning and maintenance of a security video surveillance system. Its PPT, dated 14 August 2026, provides for 38 new cameras and the integration of 124 existing cameras into a central video management system (VMS).

The AEPD points to three provisions. Section 6.1.4 (p. 23) allows cameras with video analytics that detect people and vehicles using AI, with a dedicated AI processor in the camera. The AEPD notes that the PPT specifies that the cameras analyse "el 100 % de la escena el 100 % del tiempo", even with no event configured. Section 6.1.6 (p. 24) provides for "búsqueda por apariencia" by clothing colour, hair colour, sex and age group across multiple cameras, started by selecting a person in a recording or importing an image or photograph. Section 6.3.4 (pp. 31 and 32) provides for storing the analytics output as metadata for later use.

On facial recognition the AEPD is explicit: "La documentación examinada no permite afirmar que se vaya a realizar reconocimiento facial ni tratamiento de datos biométricos dirigido a la identificación unívoca". It adds that the papers also do not show what technical representation the system would generate to locate a person across cameras from a photograph or physical traits.

Its list for the municipality adds, among other items, whether cameras, VMS or servers contain facial recognition, face matching or person re-identification even if initially disabled; the nature of the technical representations used for appearance search; what the system does with an uploaded photograph; and separate retention periods for images, photographs, metadata and search results. The warning also brings in art. 10 of Organic Law 7/2021, on distinguishing facts from assessments and avoiding inaccurate data, for automated inferences of sex, age or other physical attributes, and art. 14, on decisions based solely on automated processing, if any function came to be used that way.

How do the two warnings compare?

They share the same legal frame and differ in what the specification contains.

Do the warnings prove deployment, a ban or AI Act enforcement?

No to all three. The AEPD describes the aim of a warning in AI-00170: "el objetivo de la advertencia no es sancionar una conducta del responsable o encargado, sino advertir". Its press note adds in a footnote that adopting the measure is not a declaration that the recipient committed an infringement. Neither warning states that a function was installed or used, or that one is prohibited. The AEPD also writes that data protection law does not prevent these technologies, provided the processing has adequate safeguards.

The legal basis is the GDPR and Organic Law 7/2021. We found no reference to Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 in either PDF or in the press note.

Each warning closes with a conditional consequence: if the municipality does not adopt the measures that may be necessary to bring its conduct into line with the law, it "podría incurrir en una infracción en el ámbito competencial de esta Agencia", which "podría dar lugar al inicio de actuaciones previas de investigación y/o actuaciones correctivas, incluyendo las sancionadoras".

What does it mean for municipal counsel, DPOs, procurement officers and vendors, and what should be done now?

Our interpretation: both warnings start from the content of tender specifications, as the AEPD describes them, so a specification that lists an AI function is within what the AEPD examines.

Municipal legal counsel. The warnings treat the municipality as the party answerable for justifying activation, and they split the legal basis by purpose: GDPR for some operations, Organic Law 7/2021 for Policía Local operations within its scope.

DPOs. The AEPD's lists read as a scoping outline for the impact assessment. They cover per-function necessity, derived data and its retention, access and remote access, and later updates that add capability, across the life cycle from requirements to decommissioning.

Procurement officers. On our reading, requiring or permitting a function in a specification and deciding to run it are separate decisions, and the file should show the second one made on its own reasons. AI-00171 shows the AEPD also reading deployment details such as always-on analysis and photograph-based search.

Vendors. Both warnings are addressed to the municipality. Our reading is that buyers will want, for each function, what it outputs, how long that is kept, who can reach it, whether it ships disabled, and whether face-matching or re-identification components exist even if off.

What should be done now?

• List every AI analysis function named in live or planned video surveillance tenders: facial detection or recognition, person or vehicle detection, appearance search, metadata generation.
• For each function, record the purpose, the necessity and proportionality reasoning, and the default state. Keep a function off until that reasoning exists.
• Run or update the impact assessment where the risk is high, and put derived data (metadata, photographs, search results, templates) in the retention schedule.
• Add a change-control step so that a software or model update adding identification capability triggers a new assessment.
• Vendors: prepare a per-function sheet of outputs, retention settings, access profiles, default states and any dormant face-matching or re-identification components.

What we did not verify

What we opened: the full text of both AEPD warnings, AI-00170-2026 (six pages) and AI-00171-2026 (seven pages), as PDFs fetched on 24 October 2026, the AEPD press note of 6 October 2026, and the AEPD resolutions register entries for both documents. Quotations come from those files in the original Spanish with accents.

What we did not open: the tender documents and technical specifications themselves, so every statement about them is the AEPD's description; the legislation cited, beyond how the warnings quote it; and any later AEPD, municipal or press follow-up.

What we refuse to claim: that any function has been installed or used, that any tender was awarded, amended or withdrawn, that a fine, sanction or ban exists, that the warnings bind anyone beyond the existing law they cite, that this is AI Act enforcement, or which municipalities are involved. The published text redacts their names. The PDFs print no date; the signature date (29 September 2026) and publication date (6 October 2026) come from the AEPD resolutions register. Translations and paraphrases are ours.

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