AI Regulation Tracker / Courts and sanctions
Four US appellate courts, four different remedies for fabricated citations by self-represented litigants
In nine days, panels in Oregon, Tennessee, Florida and Illinois each addressed fabricated or apparently nonexistent authority in a brief filed by a self-represented litigant. One fined $100. One dismissed the appeal on cumulative briefing violations. One issued an order to show cause seeking a permanent filing bar. One admonished and moved on.
What did the four courts actually do?
Side by side, the spread is the story. Similar briefing defects involving fabricated or nonexistent authority, four consequences, nine days, four courts that do not answer to one another.
| Court | Case and docket | Decided | Conduct the court identified | Remedy imposed | Stated basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oregon Court of Appeals | State of Oregon v. Dixon, No. A184062 (Clackamas County No. 19CR42686), 351 Or App 603 | July 15, 2026 | Citations that appeared to be to nonexistent cases, plus existing cases cited for propositions they did not support | Citations struck, corrected brief refused, $100 fine, judgment affirmed | Court's own order to show cause; per curiam memorandum under ORAP 10.30. Intent expressly not required. |
| Tennessee Court of Appeals at Jackson | Merritt v. Moore, No. W2025-01131-COA-R3-CV (Shelby County No. CT-4667-23) | July 21, 2026 | At least one apparently nonexistent authority, alongside briefing defects | Appeal dismissed in full, total waiver of all issues | Tenn. R. App. P. 27 and Ct. App. R. 6, applied cumulatively |
| Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal | Gouldy v. Chiasson, No. 4D2025-1289 (15th Jud. Cir., Palm Beach County, No. 502021CA000123XXXXMB) | July 22, 2026 | A phantom case and fabricated quotations attributed to a real case | Affirmed, plus a separate order to show cause seeking a bar on all future self-represented filings in that court. No bar imposed; opinion not final. | Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(a), framed against the court's expanded jurisdiction over county-court appeals |
| Illinois Appellate Court, Third District | Graves v. Graves, 2026 IL App (3d) 250490-U, No. 3-25-0490 (Will County No. 24-OP-1870) | July 23, 2026 | Citation of non-existent case law in the appellant's brief | Admonishment only. Dismissal as a sanction declined; order of protection vacated. | Panel discretion weighed against the merits. Rule 23 order. |
Why does the remedy vary so much for similar conduct?
Because no rule specific to this situation tells these panels what to do. Each court described its own approach, and the four passages do not converge.
Oregon put intent on the record and fined anyway: "We have disregarded the citations that defendant relies on that appear to be to nonexistent cases and the citations that, although to existing cases, do not stand for the propositions upon which defendant relies. In response to an order to show cause from this court, defendant stated that she did not intentionally include any fabricated authority and that she was not aware that her drafting process could produce fabricated authority. We denied her motion to file a corrected brief, struck the citations that were fabricated, and imposed a $100 fine." (Dixon, No. A184062, page 2, footnote 2.) The court accepted the account of unintentional fabrication and sanctioned regardless.
Tennessee went the other way on severity. The passage available for direct quotation is the terminology footnote: "This Court has previously referred to such fabricated case citations as 'Artificial Intelligence hallucinations,' described as 'a widely reported phenomenon in which artificial intelligence programs create new information that has no basis in fact.'" (Merritt, No. W2025-01131-COA-R3-CV, page 7, footnote 1, citing Simmons v. Islam, No. M2025-01261-COA-R3-CV, 2026 WL 1431143, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 21, 2026).) The dismissal itself rests on cumulative briefing failures under Tenn. R. App. P. 27 and Ct. App. R. 6, and the opinion identifies at least one apparently nonexistent authority among the defects. No verbatim passage dismissing for the fabrication standing alone is available in the source, and none is asserted here.
Florida is the decision that explicitly describes a broader structural problem. The panel wrote: "Recently, however, it appears that many pro se litigants, in both county and circuit courts, are using artificial intelligence platforms to generate appellate briefs and motions. While the prose in these filings is generally readable, many AI-generated submissions contain phantom authority, misstatements of the record, and fabricated quotations. Pro se litigants are not governed by the ethical rules with which licensed attorneys must comply. Because a principled appellate court must examine the issues raised by the parties, digging into AI-generated filings consumes valuable time that could be better spent on other cases." (Gouldy, No. 4D2025-1289, conclusion.)
Illinois declined to dismiss the appeal as a sanction, and said why: "As a final matter, we admonish Brian for citing non-existent case law in his brief but decline Mary's request to dismiss the appeal as a sanction. In doing so, we note the lack of any case law addressing the anomalous procedure employed here, including the case law upon which Mary relies. There is simply no authority to support the trial court's outright disregard of Brian's procedural due process rights." (Graves, 2026 IL App (3d) 250490-U, paragraph 32.) The merits carried the day. The panel concluded that the trial court had disregarded procedural due process rights and therefore did not dismiss the appeal as a sanction for the bad citations.
Which rules actually reach a self-represented filer?
Very few. The AI filing regime built over the last two years runs through the lawyer. Certification requirements, bar ethics opinions, candour duties, disciplinary exposure: each attaches to a license. Florida's own amended Rule of Judicial Administration 2.515 is addressed to attorneys, as is the standing-order layer in many federal district courts.
Strip out the license and the toolkit thins to procedural rules of general application, briefing requirements, and inherent authority. That is the mix all four panels appear to have relied on, which helps explain the spread in outcomes. Inherent authority does not come with a fixed schedule of sanctions. No generally applicable, filer-neutral rule specifies whether unverified authority from a self-represented filer should result in a monetary sanction, dismissal, or limitations on future filings.
What does this mean for a US litigator on Monday?
First, when you are opposing a self-represented party, the remedy you request can significantly influence how the court responds. Illinois declined a dismissal request because the merits ran the other way. Tennessee ended an appeal on cumulative briefing defects, of which the fabricated authority was one. Frame the motion around rule violations you can prove, not the fabrication alone.
Second, checking the other side's citations is part of the work now. Oregon disregarded nonexistent cases and real cases cited for propositions they do not support. The second category will not show up in a citator check.
Third, do not assume intent is a live issue. Oregon accepted that the fabrication was unintentional and sanctioned anyway.
What does this mean for legal aid and self-help centres?
Exposure now varies by state for similar conduct, and the consequences are communicated chiefly through case-specific decisions rather than clear, posted guidance to self-represented filers. A self-help centre in Portland warns about a fine, one in Memphis about losing the appeal, one in West Palm Beach about a possible permanent bar on filing without a lawyer. For someone who cannot afford counsel, such limits on self-represented filings can function as a significant barrier to access.
The intake question worth adding needs no technical knowledge. Ask whether the person can produce the source of every case they cite. Not whether they used a chatbot. Whether they have read the case.
What these four decisions do not do
They do not create a generally applicable rule governing all similar future cases. Two of the four are expressly nonprecedential. None imposes a filing bar: Florida's is a show-cause order with the question open, and that opinion is not final. Neither Oregon nor Illinois attributes the fabrication to a named AI product, and Oregon does not use the phrase artificial intelligence at all.
They also do not close the gap they expose. That would take a rule of general application reaching every filer, not another certification aimed at counsel.
Frequently asked questions
Has any of the four courts actually barred a litigant from filing?
No. Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause on July 22, 2026 in No. 4D2025-1289 seeking to bar the appellant from future self-represented filings in that court. No bar has been imposed, and the accompanying opinion states that it is not final until disposition of a timely-filed motion for rehearing.
Does a lack of intent excuse a fabricated citation?
Not in the Oregon case. In State of Oregon v. Dixon, No. A184062, decided July 15, 2026, the court recorded that the defendant stated she did not intentionally include fabricated authority and was unaware her drafting process could produce it. The court struck the citations and imposed a $100 fine anyway.
Why do attorney ethics rules not resolve the problem?
Because they do not reach the filer. Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal stated in No. 4D2025-1289 that pro se litigants are not governed by the ethical rules with which licensed attorneys must comply. Certification rules such as Florida's Rule of Judicial Administration 2.515 are addressed to attorneys, so courts reaching self-represented filers work from inherent authority and procedure rules instead.
Are these four decisions binding precedent?
Two are expressly limited. The Oregon decision is a nonprecedential per curiam memorandum opinion under ORAP 10.30. The Illinois decision is a Supreme Court Rule 23 order, nonprecedential except as allowed by Rule 23(e)(1). All four are examples of how panels have exercised their discretion; they are not controlling authority outside their own courts.
Last verified: July 28, 2026