A federal judge in Montana has preliminarily enjoined the Attorney General, the Lewis and Clark County Attorney and the Commissioner of Political Practices from enforcing the state's election-deepfake law against Accountability in State Government and Dan Bartel, and against those two plaintiffs only, after finding them likely to succeed on their First Amendment claims

What the order does, and for whom

The operative paragraph begins at the foot of p.39, ends on p.40 and is two sentences long. The motion at Doc. 6 is granted, and Austin Knudsen, Kevin Downs and Chris Gallus "are HEREBY ENJOINED from reviewing, investigating, prosecuting, adjudicating, or enforcing the Act against the named Plaintiffs." The Act is Senate Bill 25 (2025), codified at Mont. Code Ann. 13-35-801 to 13-35-804 (p.1). The named plaintiffs are Accountability in State Government, a Montana independent political committee, and Dan Bartel, whom the order describes as a former state legislator (pp.1, 5). The three defendants are sued in their official capacities as Montana Attorney General, Lewis and Clark County Attorney and Montana Commissioner of Political Practices (p.1).

Read the last four words of that sentence before anything else. The court did not enjoin enforcement of the Act as such. At p.39 it wrote that it "lacks the authority under the Judiciary Act of 1789 to issue a universal injunction prohibiting enforcement globally against anyone impacted by the Act" and that, "To comply with the mandate that equitable relief be no more burdensome than necessary, relief must be limited to the named Plaintiffs." Nonparties are outside this injunction's protection. The order does not decide what the Act means for any other speaker; it decides that this court, on this motion, cannot extend its injunction to them.

The posture matters in every sentence that follows. This is a preliminary injunction under the Winter standard, entered after a hearing on 21 August 2026 and before any final judgment (pp.1, 6). Each merits finding in it is a finding that the plaintiffs are likely to succeed, not a final adjudication, and the order itself sets no end date. No appeal, stay or later order appeared on the public docket mirror the desk read on 19 September 2026; the official docket was not checked.

The statute the plaintiffs challenged

Section 13-35-802(1)(a), read from the Montana Legislature's archive, provides that "a person, corporation, committee, political party, or other entity, working in an official election capacity, may not, within 60 days of the initiation of voting in an election at which a candidate for elective office appears on the ballot, pay for or sponsor the production, creation, or distribution" of an election communication or electioneering communication that the entity "knew or should have known is a deepfake of a candidate or political party on the ballot". The clock runs from the initiation of voting, not from election day, and the desk does not convert it into a calendar date.

The order sets out the definition at pp.2-3. A deepfake under 13-35-801(3) is "AI-generated content or synthetic media that depicts a candidate or political party with the intent to injure the reputation of the candidate or party or otherwise deceive a voter", and the media has to either appear to a reasonable person to depict something that did not occur or give a reasonable person a fundamentally different understanding from the unaltered original. AI-generated content is limited to material substantially created or modified by generative AI in a way that materially alters its meaning, and content that is only minimally edited, adjusted or enhanced is excluded (p.3, citing 13-35-801(1)(a)-(b)). An image touched by an AI tool is not, on the statute's own terms, automatically a deepfake.

Subsection (1)(b) is the safe harbour. The prohibition does not apply to a communication that carries a disclosure stating, in the statute's own printed form, "This _____ (image/audio/video/multimedia) has been significantly edited by artificial intelligence and depicts speech or conduct that falsely appears to be authentic or truthful". Subsection (1)(c) fixes the format: for print, bold type of at least 12 points; for television or video, clearly readable throughout and at least 4% of the vertical picture height; for an internet communication with text or graphics, viewable without user action and large enough to be clearly readable; for audio, at least 8 seconds, clearly audible, at the beginning or the end. The order renders the media choices in square brackets at p.3; the wording otherwise agrees with the archive text.

Subsection (2) lists five exemptions: a broadcast or transmission by a radio or television station, cable or satellite operator, streaming service, website, programmer or producer as part of a bona fide newscast, interview, documentary or on-the-spot news coverage, if it clearly acknowledges through context or a disclaimer, in a manner that can be easily read or heard, both that the content may be generated in whole or in part by artificial intelligence and that it may not accurately represent the speech or conduct of the depicted individual; a broadcaster paid to air a deepfake, or airing a legally qualified candidate's advertisement that federal law requires it to carry; "a deepfake that constitutes satire or parody"; a distribution platform whose disclaimer requirements match (1)(b)-(c) and were passed to the purchaser; and an interactive computer service, information service or telecommunications service carrying another party's content. The court noted that satire and parody are left undefined (p.4).

Remedies, as the order describes them at pp.4-5, run on two tracks. Under 13-35-803 a candidate or party aggrieved by a violation may sue for injunctive relief and recover actual damages, up to $10,000 in punitive damages, costs and attorney fees, with an expedited docket on a showing of ongoing harm. Under 13-35-804 complaints go to the Commissioner of Political Practices; the order says a first sufficiency finding triggers civil penalties, a second is referred to the county attorney for misdemeanor prosecution and a third to the Attorney General or county attorney for felony prosecution, and that a criminal prosecution does not bar a parallel civil suit. The desk did not open sections 803 and 804 separately and reports them as the order states them.

Why the court found the plaintiffs likely to succeed

Content first. The order records that "Defendants conceded during oral argument that the Act discriminates based on content" (p.25). The court agreed with both sides that the Act is, at minimum, content-based, because enforcement authorities have to examine the substance of an image, audio or video to decide whether it depicts a deepfake of a candidate, and it concluded on that page that the plaintiffs are likely to succeed in establishing content-based discrimination.

Viewpoint second, and this is the finding with the sharpest edge. The court read the reputation-injury prong of the definition as penalising derogatory deepfakes while a flattering deepfake of the same synthetic quality escapes that prong, and it held that the viewpoint-neutral deception catch-all at the end of the definition does not cure that (p.27). Its conclusion, at the foot of p.27, is that "because the Act treats identically deceptive media differently based solely on whether its message is weaponized to damage or deployed to elevate a candidate, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed in establishing that the Act constitutes viewpoint-based discrimination." The finding attaches to the reputation-injury prong; the order does not say a laudatory deepfake is outside the whole statute.

Strict scrutiny followed. The plaintiffs conceded, and the court agreed, that Montana has a compelling interest in the integrity of its elections (p.28); the dispute was narrow tailoring. The plaintiffs pointed to counterspeech, educational campaigns, existing tort law and Montana's existing crime of interfering with a voter's franchise under 13-25-318 (p.29). The court wrote that the defendants "do not discredit, address, or otherwise attempt to explain why these less restrictive alternatives are insufficient" (p.30, partial sentence), and said it was joining Kohls v. Bonta (E.D. Cal. 2025) and Babylon Bee, LLC v. Lopez (D. Haw. 2026) in recognising those alternatives. At this preliminary stage, that was enough for the court to find the Act not narrowly tailored.

The defendants' fallback was the Disclosure. They compared it to the sponsor disclaimer upheld in Citizens United (p.30). The court accepted the plaintiffs' distinction: a sponsor disclaimer tells voters who paid, whereas this Disclosure requires the speaker to label its own content as unauthentic or untruthful. In the court's words at p.31, "Unlike standard donor or sponsor disclaimers, the Act's Disclosure forces creators to "speak a particular message" that they would otherwise omit" (partial sentence; the original continues). It concluded at p.32 that the Disclosure does not save the Act, that the Act fails strict scrutiny for lack of narrow tailoring, and that the plaintiffs "have therefore demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their First Amendment facial challenge." All of that is a likelihood finding on a preliminary motion.

The remaining Winter factors took a page. Citing Ninth Circuit authority that a colorable First Amendment claim carries irreparable harm and tips the balance of hardships, the court wrote at p.33: "In sum, Plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their First Amendment challenge, and they have satisfied the remaining Winter factors."

Standing and mootness: the Gallus declaration did not end the case

The facts are on p.5. The plaintiffs distribute mailers analysing candidates' legislative records; the mailers use authentic photographs and also integrate realistic AI-generated imagery. The order lists two mailers showing candidates wearing preferred-pronoun pins and holding pride flags, and a third showing a candidate at a gas pump spraying ten-dollar bills with the price reading "Arm" and "Leg". Two of the targeted candidates and another legislator filed administrative complaints. Commissioner Gallus told the plaintiffs the complaints met basic screening requirements, set out the statutory penalties and ordered a response, which the plaintiffs filed on 10 August 2026 after extensions.

On 20 August 2026, the day before the hearing, the defendants filed a declaration by Commissioner Gallus saying he found dismissal appropriate because the mailers fall within the satire or parody exemption, and that an official dismissal was forthcoming (pp.5-6). The defendants also argued the mailers were visual metaphor, not realistic depiction, and fell squarely within the satire or parody exemption (p.10). The court did not treat any of that as ending the case. At p.20 it wrote that "Defendants have not disavowed enforcement of the Act." It noted that any private individual can file a complaint (p.16), that the defendants had provided no evidence the pending complaints had actually been dismissed, and that the declaration bound neither Downs nor Knudsen and said nothing about the private right of action (p.20).

The line campaign counsel will quote is also on p.20, and it is a partial sentence: "without clear statutory definitions for terms like "satire" and "parody," Plaintiffs hold an objectively reasonable fear of future enforcement." The court then said the plaintiffs intend to sponsor advertisements for the 3 November 2026 general election that risk violating the Act (p.6), which is why the injury was ongoing. Yellowstone Public Radio's 17 September 2026 report described the complaints as since dismissed; the order, as of 16 September, records no evidence of dismissal before the court. The desk reports both and resolves neither.

Scope of relief: why the injunction stops at two names

Section III.D, pp.34-39, is where the order departs from what the plaintiffs asked for. Their motion sought an order enjoining the defendants from enforcing the Act globally, not only as to the named parties (p.34). At the close of the hearing the defendants asked that any injunction be no more burdensome than necessary and cited Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831 (2025), for the proposition that broad injunctions against the overall enforcement of a law likely exceed a federal court's equitable authority (p.34). The plaintiffs tried to distinguish CASA as a case about federal enforcement that involved no First Amendment claim and did not address declaratory relief (pp.34-35).

The court took the defendants' side on every point. It read CASA as restricting universal injunctions, those that prohibit enforcement of a law against anyone rather than against named plaintiffs, and as resting on the remedies available under the Judiciary Act of 1789 (p.35). It found no basis to distinguish CASA because this case involves a First Amendment overbreadth challenge, citing the Eleventh Circuit's decision in HM Florida-ORL, LLC v. Governor of Florida (Aug. 4, 2026) for the point that CASA concerned remedies, not causes of action (p.38). The declaratory-relief argument, the court said, falls flat, because the CASA plaintiffs also sought declaratory relief and CASA itself reached the Supreme Court at the preliminary-injunction stage (p.38).

The conclusion at p.39 is the sentence that fixes the scope: "The Court therefore lacks the authority under the Judiciary Act of 1789 to issue a universal injunction prohibiting enforcement globally against anyone impacted by the Act." Prohibiting enforcement against these plaintiffs, the court said, gives them whole and absolute relief, and extending it to others similarly situated would not make their relief any more complete. So the injunction is limited to preventing enforcement against the named plaintiffs.

One passage in the merits section should not be mistaken for the scope of the order. At p.32 the court quotes a parenthetical from Imperial Sovereign Court to the effect that a content-based restriction that fails strict scrutiny is facially invalid and cannot be enforced against anyone. That is another court's language, quoted in the reasoning; the relief is at pp.39-40 and it names two plaintiffs. The order therefore neither protects nonparties nor validates the Act against them. At p.38 the court says a district court has to tailor its injunction to complete relief for the named plaintiffs and nothing more. Other speakers receive no protection from this injunction; the order does not decide how they might obtain relief.

What comes next, and what the desk found

Yellowstone Public Radio reported on 17 September 2026 that a spokesperson for Attorney General Knudsen said the office was disappointed in the decision and was reviewing the ruling to determine next steps. That is a reported reaction, not a filing, and it comes from secondary reporting that the desk opened and read.

On the CourtListener docket mirror, read on 19 September 2026, the last entry was 31, the order itself. The desk found no notice of appeal, no motion for a stay and no later order on that mirror. The official PACER docket was not checked, so the desk does not state whether an appeal has been filed, only that none appeared on the public mirror it read.

The order sits alongside two other district-court rulings it cites at p.30: Kohls v. Bonta in the Eastern District of California and Babylon Bee, LLC v. Lopez in the District of Hawaii, the latter covered on this desk. What is different here is the remedy. The general election the plaintiffs are preparing for is on 3 November 2026 (p.6). For every Montana speaker other than these two, the order changes no word of the statute and grants no protection; whether and how the Act applies to them is not something this order decides.

What we did not verify

What we opened: the 40-page RECAP copy of Doc. 31, whose opinion body is a scan (only the ECF headers are searchable text), so we read the following pages as rendered images: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 16, 20, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 38, 39 and 40. Every quotation above was read from those images. We also opened the text of Mont. Code Ann. 13-35-802 from the Montana Legislature's archive through a text proxy, the CourtListener docket page for case 6:26-cv-00038, and Yellowstone Public Radio's report of 17 September 2026.

What we did not open: pages 7 to 9, 11 to 15, 17 to 19, 21 to 24, 26, 36 and 37 of the order, so nothing above rests on them; sections 13-35-801, 13-35-803 and 13-35-804 as separate statutory texts, which we describe only as the order describes them; the motion papers, the Gallus declaration and the hearing transcript; the Kohls, Babylon Bee and HM Florida-ORL decisions themselves; and the official PACER docket. The public docket mirror we read ended at entry 31 on 19 September 2026, and we found no appeal or stay on it. We did not check the official docket, so we do not say whether an appeal or stay has been filed.

What we refuse to claim: we do not say the statute has been invalidated, blocked for all speakers or finally decided, because the relief at pp.39-40 runs to the two named plaintiffs and the merits findings are likelihood-of-success findings on a preliminary motion. We do not say the Act is enforceable against every other speaker, because the order does not decide that; it decides that nonparties are outside this injunction's protection. We do not say the plaintiffs are immune from private suits under 13-35-803 or from any other law, because the order enjoins three officials and says nothing else. We do not say every AI disclosure rule fails the First Amendment, because the court's compelled-speech finding concerns this Act's Disclosure and expressly distinguishes sponsor disclaimers. We give no date for the 60-day trigger, no count of other states' deepfake statutes and no original effective date for SB 25. The scanned order uses typographic quotation marks and apostrophes; this article renders them as straight marks, which is a house typesetting convention and not a change to any word, and two quotations, from pp.20 and 31, are marked above as partial sentences.

Informational analysis for working professionals, not legal advice. Confirm how any rule applies to your situation with qualified counsel.

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